parts/context: work on introduction
Figuring out what exactly will follow I need to know what I can build upon.
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BibTeX export options can be customized via Options -> BibTeX in Mendeley Desktop
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@article{Szekeres2013,
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abstract = {Memory corruption bugs in software written in low-level languages like C or C++ are one of the oldest problems in computer security. The lack of safety in these languages allows attackers to alter the program's behavior or take full control over it by hijacking its control flow. This problem has existed for more than 30 years and a vast number of potential solutions have been proposed, yet memory corruption attacks continue to pose a serious threat. Real world exploits show that all currently deployed protections can be defeated. This paper sheds light on the primary reasons for this by describing attacks that succeed on today's systems. We systematize the current knowledge about various protection techniques by setting up a general model for memory corrup- tion attacks. Using this model we show what policies can stop which attacks. The model identifies weaknesses of currently deployed techniques, as well as other proposed protections enforcing stricter policies. We analyze the reasons why protection mechanisms imple- menting stricter polices are not deployed. To achieve wide adoption, protection mechanisms must support a multitude of features and must satisfy a host of requirements. Especially important is performance, as experience shows that only solutions whose overhead is in reasonable bounds get deployed. A comparison of different enforceable policies helps de- signers of new protection mechanisms in finding the balance between effectiveness (security) and efficiency.We identify some open research problems, and provide suggestions on improving the adoption of newer techniques.},
|
||||
author = {Szekeres, L??szl?? and Payer, Mathias and Wei, Tao and Song, Dawn},
|
||||
doi = {10.1109/SP.2013.13},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/SoK$\backslash$: Eternal War in Memory.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
isbn = {9780769549774},
|
||||
issn = {10816011},
|
||||
journal = {Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy},
|
||||
pages = {48--62},
|
||||
title = {{SoK: Eternal war in memory}},
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
@article{Levy2015a,
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||||
abstract = {Rust, a new systems programming language, provides compile-time memory safety checks to help eliminate runtime bugs that manifest from improper memory management. This feature is advantageous for operating system development, and especially for embedded OS development, where recovery and debugging are particularly challenging. However, embedded platforms are highly event-based, and Rust's memory safety mechanisms largely presume threads. In our experience developing an operating system for embedded systems in Rust, we have found that Rust's ownership model prevents otherwise safe resource sharing common in the embedded domain, conflicts with the reality of hardware resources, and hinders using closures for programming asynchronously. We describe these experiences and how they relate to memory safety as well as illustrate our workarounds that preserve the safety guarantees to the largest extent possible. In addition, we draw from our experience to propose a new language extension to Rust that would enable it to provide better memory safety tools for event-driven platforms.},
|
||||
author = {Levy, Amit and Andersen, Michael P. and Campbell, Bradford and Culler, David and Dutta, Prabal and Ghena, Branden and Levis, Philip and Pannuto, Pat},
|
||||
doi = {10.1145/2818302.2818306},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/tock-plos2015.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
isbn = {9781450339421},
|
||||
journal = {PLOS: Workshop on Programming Languages and Operating Systems},
|
||||
keywords = {embedded operating systems,linear types,ownership,rust},
|
||||
pages = {21--26},
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||||
title = {{Ownership is Theft: Experiences Building an Embedded OS in Rust}},
|
||||
url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2818302.2818306},
|
||||
year = {2015}
|
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}
|
||||
@article{Affairs2015,
|
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author = {Affairs, Post Doctoral},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/You can't spell trust without Rust.pdf:pdf},
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title = {{YOU CAN ' T SPELL TRUST WITHOUT RUST alexis beingessner Master ' s in Computer Science Carleton University}},
|
||||
year = {2015}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@article{Merity2016,
|
||||
abstract = {Recent neural network sequence models with softmax classifiers have achieved their best language modeling performance only with very large hidden states and large vocabularies. Even then they struggle to predict rare or unseen words even if the context makes the prediction unambiguous. We introduce the pointer sentinel mixture architecture for neural sequence models which has the ability to either reproduce a word from the recent context or produce a word from a standard softmax classifier. Our pointer sentinel-LSTM model achieves state of the art language modeling performance on the Penn Treebank (70.9 perplexity) while using far fewer parameters than a standard softmax LSTM. In order to evaluate how well language models can exploit longer contexts and deal with more realistic vocabularies and larger corpora we also introduce the freely available WikiText corpus.},
|
||||
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
|
||||
arxivId = {1609.07843},
|
||||
author = {Merity, Stephen and Xiong, Caiming and Bradbury, James and Socher, Richard},
|
||||
eprint = {1609.07843},
|
||||
journal = {Arxiv},
|
||||
title = {{Pointer Sentinel Mixture Models}},
|
||||
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1609.07843},
|
||||
year = {2016}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@misc{Endler,
|
||||
author = {Endler, Matthias},
|
||||
title = {{A curated list of static analysis tools, linters and code quality checkers for various programming languages}},
|
||||
url = {https://github.com/mre/awesome-static-analysis}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@inproceedings{Kuznetsov2014,
|
||||
abstract = {Systems code is often written in low-level languages like C/C++, which offer many benefits but also dele- gate memory management to programmers. This invites memory safety bugs that attackers can exploit to divert control flow and compromise the system. Deployed de- fense mechanisms (e.g., ASLR, DEP) are incomplete, and stronger defense mechanisms (e.g., CFI) often have high overhead and limited guarantees [19, 15, 9]. We introduce code-pointer integrity (CPI), a new de- sign point that guarantees the integrity of all code point- ers in a program (e.g., function pointers, saved return ad- dresses) and thereby prevents all control-flow hijack at- tacks, including return-oriented programming. We also introduce code-pointer separation (CPS), a relaxation of CPI with better performance properties. CPI and CPS offer substantially better security-to-overhead ratios than the state of the art, they are practical (we protect a complete FreeBSD system and over 100 packages like apache and postgresql), effective (prevent all attacks in the RIPE benchmark), and efficient: on SPEC CPU2006, CPS averages 1.2{\%} overhead for C and 1.9{\%} for C/C++, while CPI's overhead is 2.9{\%} for C and 8.4{\%} for C/C++. A prototype implementation of CPI and CPS can be obtained from http://levee.epfl.ch. 1},
|
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author = {Kuznetsov, Volodymyr and Szekeres, L{\'{a}}szl{\'{o}} and Payer, Mathias},
|
||||
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation},
|
||||
isbn = {9781931971164},
|
||||
pages = {147--163},
|
||||
title = {{Code-pointer integrity}},
|
||||
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi14/technical-sessions/presentation/kuznetsov{\%}5Cnhttps://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi14/osdi14-paper-kuznetsov.pdf?utm{\_}source=dlvr.it{\&}utm{\_}medium=tumblr},
|
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year = {2014}
|
||||
}
|
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@article{Caballero2012,
|
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abstract = {Use-after-free vulnerabilities are rapidly growing in popularity, especially for exploiting web browsers. Use-after-free (and double-free) vulnerabilities are caused by a program operating on a dangling pointer. In this work we propose early detection, a novel runtime approach for finding and diagnosing use-after-free and double-free vulnerabilities. While previous work focuses on the creation of the vulnerability (i.e., the use of a dangling pointer), early detection shifts the focus to the creation of the dangling pointer(s) at the root of the vulnerability. Early detection increases the effectiveness of testing by identifying unsafe dangling pointers in executions where they are created but not used. It also accelerates vulnerability analysis and minimizes the risk of incomplete fixes, by automatically collecting information about all dangling pointers involved in the vulnerability. We implement our early detection technique in a tool called Undangle. We evaluate Undangle for vulnerability analysis on 8 real-world vulnerabilities. The analysis uncovers that two separate vulnerabilities in Firefox had a common root cause and that their patches did not completely fix the underlying bug. We also evaluate Undangle for testing on the Firefox web browser identifying a potential vulnerability.},
|
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author = {Caballero, Juan and Grieco, Gustavo and Marron, Mark and Nappa, Antonio},
|
||||
doi = {10.1145/2338965.2336769},
|
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isbn = {9781450314541},
|
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issn = {1450314546},
|
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journal = {ISSTA},
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keywords = {automated testing,binary analysis,debugging,dynamic analysis},
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pages = {133},
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title = {{Undangle: early detection of dangling pointers in use-after-free and double-free vulnerabilities}},
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url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2338965.2336769},
|
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year = {2012}
|
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}
|
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@article{Lattner2005,
|
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abstract = {The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure (http://llvm.cs. uiuc.edu) is a$\backslash$nrobust system that is well suited for a wide variety of research$\backslash$nand development work. This brief paper introduces the LLVM system$\backslash$nand provides pointers to more extensive documentation, complementing$\backslash$nthe tutorial presented at LCPC.},
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@ -33,62 +79,27 @@ title = {{The LLVM Compiler Framework and Infrastructure Tutorial}},
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url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11532378{\_}2},
|
||||
year = {2005}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@misc{Endler,
|
||||
author = {Endler, Matthias},
|
||||
title = {{A curated list of static analysis tools, linters and code quality checkers for various programming languages}},
|
||||
url = {https://github.com/mre/awesome-static-analysis}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@article{Balasubramanian2017,
|
||||
abstract = {Rust is a new system programming language that offers a practical and safe alternative to C. Rust is unique in that it enforces safety without runtime overhead, most importantly, without the overhead of garbage collection. While zero-cost safety is remarkable on its own, we argue that the super-powers of Rust go beyond safety. In particular, Rust's linear type system enables capabilities that cannot be implemented efficiently in traditional languages, both safe and unsafe, and that dramatically improve security and reliability of system software. We show three examples of such capabilities: zero-copy software fault isolation, efficient static information flow analysis, and automatic checkpointing. While these capabilities have been in the spotlight of systems research for a long time, their practical use is hindered by high cost and complexity. We argue that with the adoption of Rust these mechanisms will become commoditized.},
|
||||
author = {Balasubramanian, Abhiram and Baranowski, Marek S and Burtsev, Anton and Irvine, Uc and Rakamari, Zvonimir and Ryzhyk, Leonid and Research, Vmware},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/DRAFT$\backslash$: System Programming in Rust$\backslash$: Beyond Safety.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
title = {{DRAFT: System Programming in Rust: Beyond Safety}},
|
||||
year = {2017}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@inproceedings{Kuznetsov2014,
|
||||
abstract = {Systems code is often written in low-level languages like C/C++, which offer many benefits but also dele- gate memory management to programmers. This invites memory safety bugs that attackers can exploit to divert control flow and compromise the system. Deployed de- fense mechanisms (e.g., ASLR, DEP) are incomplete, and stronger defense mechanisms (e.g., CFI) often have high overhead and limited guarantees [19, 15, 9]. We introduce code-pointer integrity (CPI), a new de- sign point that guarantees the integrity of all code point- ers in a program (e.g., function pointers, saved return ad- dresses) and thereby prevents all control-flow hijack at- tacks, including return-oriented programming. We also introduce code-pointer separation (CPS), a relaxation of CPI with better performance properties. CPI and CPS offer substantially better security-to-overhead ratios than the state of the art, they are practical (we protect a complete FreeBSD system and over 100 packages like apache and postgresql), effective (prevent all attacks in the RIPE benchmark), and efficient: on SPEC CPU2006, CPS averages 1.2{\%} overhead for C and 1.9{\%} for C/C++, while CPI's overhead is 2.9{\%} for C and 8.4{\%} for C/C++. A prototype implementation of CPI and CPS can be obtained from http://levee.epfl.ch. 1},
|
||||
author = {Kuznetsov, Volodymyr and Szekeres, L{\'{a}}szl{\'{o}} and Payer, Mathias},
|
||||
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation},
|
||||
isbn = {9781931971164},
|
||||
pages = {147--163},
|
||||
title = {{Code-pointer integrity}},
|
||||
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi14/technical-sessions/presentation/kuznetsov{\%}5Cnhttps://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi14/osdi14-paper-kuznetsov.pdf?utm{\_}source=dlvr.it{\&}utm{\_}medium=tumblr},
|
||||
year = {2014}
|
||||
}
|
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@article{Getreu2016,
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annote = {- runtime checkis are expensive
|
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|
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- critical with energy restriction on the target device},
|
||||
author = {Getreu, Jens},
|
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/Embedded System Security with Rust - Case Study of Heartbleed.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
pages = {1--24},
|
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title = {{Embedded System Security with Rust}},
|
||||
year = {2016}
|
||||
}
|
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@article{Xu2015,
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abstract = {Since vulnerabilities in Linux kernel are on the increase, attackers have turned their interests into related exploitation techniques. However, compared with numerous researches on exploiting use-after-free vulnerabilities in the user applications, few efforts studied how to exploit use-after-free vulnerabilities in Linux kernel due to the difficulties that mainly come from the uncertainty of the kernel memory layout. Without specific information leakage, attackers could only conduct a blind memory overwriting strategy trying to corrupt the critical part of the kernel, for which the success rate is negligible. In this work, we present a novel memory collision strategy to exploit the use-after-free vulnerabilities in Linux kernel reliably. The insight of our exploit strategy is that a probabilistic memory collision can be constructed according to the widely deployed kernel memory reuse mechanisms, which significantly increases the success rate of the attack. Based on this insight, we present two practical memory collision attacks: An object-based attack that leverages the memory recycling mechanism of the kernel allocator to achieve freed vulnerable object covering, and a physmap-based attack that takes advantage of the overlap between the physmap and the SLAB caches to achieve a more flexible memory manipulation. Our proposed attacks are universal for various Linux kernels of different architectures and could successfully exploit systems with use-after-free vulnerabilities in kernel. Particularly, we achieve privilege escalation on various popular Android devices (kernel version{\textgreater}=4.3) including those with 64-bit processors by exploiting the CVE-2015-3636 use-after-free vulnerability in Linux kernel. To our knowledge, this is the first generic kernel exploit for the latest version of Android. Finally, to defend this kind of memory collision, we propose two corresponding mitigation schemes.},
|
||||
author = {Xu, Wen and Li, Juanru and Shu, Junliang and Yang, Wenbo and Xie, Tianyi and Zhang, Yuanyuan and Gu, Dawu},
|
||||
doi = {10.1145/2810103.2813637},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/From Collision To Exploitation$\backslash$: Unleashing Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in Linux Kernel.pdf:pdf},
|
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isbn = {978-1-4503-3832-5},
|
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issn = {15437221},
|
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journal = {Ccs},
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keywords = {linux kernel exploit,memory collision,user-after-free vulnerability},
|
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pages = {414--425},
|
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title = {{From Collision To Exploitation: Unleashing Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in Linux Kernel}},
|
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url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2810103.2813637},
|
||||
@article{Arpaci-Dusseau2015,
|
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abstract = {A book covering the fundamentals of operating systems, including virtualization of the CPU and memory, threads and concurrency, and file and storage systems. Written by professors active in the field for 20 years, this text has been developed in the classrooms of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and has been used in the instruction of thousands of students.},
|
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author = {{Arpaci-Dusseau Remzi}, Arpaci-Dusseau Andrea},
|
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/operating{\_}systems{\_}{\_}three{\_}easy{\_}pieces{\_}{\_}electronic{\_}version{\_}0{\_}91{\_}.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
journal = {Arpaci-Dusseau},
|
||||
number = {0.91},
|
||||
pages = {665},
|
||||
title = {{Operating Systems: Three Easy Pieces}},
|
||||
volume = {Electronic},
|
||||
year = {2015}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@inproceedings{Ma2013,
|
||||
abstract = {—Aiming at the problem of higher memory consumption and lower execution efficiency during the dynamic detecting to C/C++ programs memory vulnerabilities, this paper presents a dynamic detection method called ISC. The ISC improves the Safe-C using pointer analysis technology. Firstly, the ISC defines a simple and efficient fat pointer representation instead of the safe pointer in the Safe-C. Furthermore, the ISC uses the unification-based analysis algorithm with one level flow static pointer. This identification reduces the number of pointers that need to be converted to fat pointers. Then in the process of program running, the ISC detects memory vulnerabilities through constantly inspecting the attributes of fat pointers. Experimental results indicate that the ISC could detect memory vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and dangling pointers. Comparing with the Safe-C, the ISC dramatically reduces the memory consumption and lightly improves the execution efficiency.},
|
||||
author = {Ma, Rui and Chen, Lingkui and Hu, Changzhen and Xue, Jingfeng and Zhao, Xiaolin},
|
||||
booktitle = {Proceedings - 2013 IEEE 11th International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, DASC 2013},
|
||||
doi = {10.1109/DASC.2013.37},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/A Dynamic Detection Method to C-C++ Programs Memory Vulnerabilities Based on Pointer Analysis.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
isbn = {9781479933815},
|
||||
keywords = {dynamic detecting,fat pointer,improved Safe-C,memory vulnerability,pointer analysis},
|
||||
pages = {52--57},
|
||||
title = {{A dynamic detection method to C/C++ programs memory vulnerabilities based on pointer analysis}},
|
||||
@article{Szekeres2013,
|
||||
abstract = {Memory corruption bugs in software written in low-level languages like C or C++ are one of the oldest problems in computer security. The lack of safety in these languages allows attackers to alter the program's behavior or take full control over it by hijacking its control flow. This problem has existed for more than 30 years and a vast number of potential solutions have been proposed, yet memory corruption attacks continue to pose a serious threat. Real world exploits show that all currently deployed protections can be defeated. This paper sheds light on the primary reasons for this by describing attacks that succeed on today's systems. We systematize the current knowledge about various protection techniques by setting up a general model for memory corrup- tion attacks. Using this model we show what policies can stop which attacks. The model identifies weaknesses of currently deployed techniques, as well as other proposed protections enforcing stricter policies. We analyze the reasons why protection mechanisms imple- menting stricter polices are not deployed. To achieve wide adoption, protection mechanisms must support a multitude of features and must satisfy a host of requirements. Especially important is performance, as experience shows that only solutions whose overhead is in reasonable bounds get deployed. A comparison of different enforceable policies helps de- signers of new protection mechanisms in finding the balance between effectiveness (security) and efficiency.We identify some open research problems, and provide suggestions on improving the adoption of newer techniques.},
|
||||
author = {Szekeres, L??szl?? and Payer, Mathias and Wei, Tao and Song, Dawn},
|
||||
doi = {10.1109/SP.2013.13},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/SoK$\backslash$: Eternal War in Memory.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
isbn = {9780769549774},
|
||||
issn = {10816011},
|
||||
journal = {Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy},
|
||||
pages = {48--62},
|
||||
title = {{SoK: Eternal war in memory}},
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@article{Chisnall2015,
|
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|
|
@ -104,15 +115,30 @@ title = {{Beyond the PDP-11 : Architectural support for a memory-safe C abstract
|
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url = {http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/pdfs/201503-asplos2015-cheri-cmachine.pdf},
|
||||
year = {2015}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@article{Merity2016,
|
||||
abstract = {Recent neural network sequence models with softmax classifiers have achieved their best language modeling performance only with very large hidden states and large vocabularies. Even then they struggle to predict rare or unseen words even if the context makes the prediction unambiguous. We introduce the pointer sentinel mixture architecture for neural sequence models which has the ability to either reproduce a word from the recent context or produce a word from a standard softmax classifier. Our pointer sentinel-LSTM model achieves state of the art language modeling performance on the Penn Treebank (70.9 perplexity) while using far fewer parameters than a standard softmax LSTM. In order to evaluate how well language models can exploit longer contexts and deal with more realistic vocabularies and larger corpora we also introduce the freely available WikiText corpus.},
|
||||
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
|
||||
arxivId = {1609.07843},
|
||||
author = {Merity, Stephen and Xiong, Caiming and Bradbury, James and Socher, Richard},
|
||||
eprint = {1609.07843},
|
||||
journal = {Arxiv},
|
||||
title = {{Pointer Sentinel Mixture Models}},
|
||||
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1609.07843},
|
||||
@article{Balasubramanian2017,
|
||||
abstract = {Rust is a new system programming language that offers a practical and safe alternative to C. Rust is unique in that it enforces safety without runtime overhead, most importantly, without the overhead of garbage collection. While zero-cost safety is remarkable on its own, we argue that the super-powers of Rust go beyond safety. In particular, Rust's linear type system enables capabilities that cannot be implemented efficiently in traditional languages, both safe and unsafe, and that dramatically improve security and reliability of system software. We show three examples of such capabilities: zero-copy software fault isolation, efficient static information flow analysis, and automatic checkpointing. While these capabilities have been in the spotlight of systems research for a long time, their practical use is hindered by high cost and complexity. We argue that with the adoption of Rust these mechanisms will become commoditized.},
|
||||
author = {Balasubramanian, Abhiram and Baranowski, Marek S and Burtsev, Anton and Irvine, Uc and Rakamari, Zvonimir and Ryzhyk, Leonid and Research, Vmware},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/DRAFT$\backslash$: System Programming in Rust$\backslash$: Beyond Safety.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
title = {{DRAFT: System Programming in Rust: Beyond Safety}},
|
||||
year = {2017}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@inproceedings{Ma2013,
|
||||
abstract = {—Aiming at the problem of higher memory consumption and lower execution efficiency during the dynamic detecting to C/C++ programs memory vulnerabilities, this paper presents a dynamic detection method called ISC. The ISC improves the Safe-C using pointer analysis technology. Firstly, the ISC defines a simple and efficient fat pointer representation instead of the safe pointer in the Safe-C. Furthermore, the ISC uses the unification-based analysis algorithm with one level flow static pointer. This identification reduces the number of pointers that need to be converted to fat pointers. Then in the process of program running, the ISC detects memory vulnerabilities through constantly inspecting the attributes of fat pointers. Experimental results indicate that the ISC could detect memory vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and dangling pointers. Comparing with the Safe-C, the ISC dramatically reduces the memory consumption and lightly improves the execution efficiency.},
|
||||
author = {Ma, Rui and Chen, Lingkui and Hu, Changzhen and Xue, Jingfeng and Zhao, Xiaolin},
|
||||
booktitle = {Proceedings - 2013 IEEE 11th International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, DASC 2013},
|
||||
doi = {10.1109/DASC.2013.37},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/A Dynamic Detection Method to C-C++ Programs Memory Vulnerabilities Based on Pointer Analysis.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
isbn = {9781479933815},
|
||||
keywords = {dynamic detecting,fat pointer,improved Safe-C,memory vulnerability,pointer analysis},
|
||||
pages = {52--57},
|
||||
title = {{A dynamic detection method to C/C++ programs memory vulnerabilities based on pointer analysis}},
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@article{Getreu2016,
|
||||
author = {Getreu, Jens},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/Embedded System Security with Rust - Case Study of Heartbleed.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
pages = {1--24},
|
||||
title = {{Embedded System Security with Rust}},
|
||||
year = {2016}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@article{Dhurjati2003,
|
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|
|
@ -130,35 +156,17 @@ title = {{Memory safety without runtime checks or garbage collection}},
|
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volume = {38},
|
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year = {2003}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@article{Levy2015a,
|
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abstract = {Rust, a new systems programming language, provides compile-time memory safety checks to help eliminate runtime bugs that manifest from improper memory management. This feature is advantageous for operating system development, and especially for embedded OS development, where recovery and debugging are particularly challenging. However, embedded platforms are highly event-based, and Rust's memory safety mechanisms largely presume threads. In our experience developing an operating system for embedded systems in Rust, we have found that Rust's ownership model prevents otherwise safe resource sharing common in the embedded domain, conflicts with the reality of hardware resources, and hinders using closures for programming asynchronously. We describe these experiences and how they relate to memory safety as well as illustrate our workarounds that preserve the safety guarantees to the largest extent possible. In addition, we draw from our experience to propose a new language extension to Rust that would enable it to provide better memory safety tools for event-driven platforms.},
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author = {Levy, Amit and Andersen, Michael P. and Campbell, Bradford and Culler, David and Dutta, Prabal and Ghena, Branden and Levis, Philip and Pannuto, Pat},
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doi = {10.1145/2818302.2818306},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/tock-plos2015.pdf:pdf},
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isbn = {9781450339421},
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journal = {PLOS: Workshop on Programming Languages and Operating Systems},
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keywords = {embedded operating systems,linear types,ownership,rust},
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pages = {21--26},
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title = {{Ownership is Theft: Experiences Building an Embedded OS in Rust}},
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url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2818302.2818306},
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year = {2015}
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}
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@article{Caballero2012,
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abstract = {Use-after-free vulnerabilities are rapidly growing in popularity, especially for exploiting web browsers. Use-after-free (and double-free) vulnerabilities are caused by a program operating on a dangling pointer. In this work we propose early detection, a novel runtime approach for finding and diagnosing use-after-free and double-free vulnerabilities. While previous work focuses on the creation of the vulnerability (i.e., the use of a dangling pointer), early detection shifts the focus to the creation of the dangling pointer(s) at the root of the vulnerability. Early detection increases the effectiveness of testing by identifying unsafe dangling pointers in executions where they are created but not used. It also accelerates vulnerability analysis and minimizes the risk of incomplete fixes, by automatically collecting information about all dangling pointers involved in the vulnerability. We implement our early detection technique in a tool called Undangle. We evaluate Undangle for vulnerability analysis on 8 real-world vulnerabilities. The analysis uncovers that two separate vulnerabilities in Firefox had a common root cause and that their patches did not completely fix the underlying bug. We also evaluate Undangle for testing on the Firefox web browser identifying a potential vulnerability.},
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author = {Caballero, Juan and Grieco, Gustavo and Marron, Mark and Nappa, Antonio},
|
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doi = {10.1145/2338965.2336769},
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isbn = {9781450314541},
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issn = {1450314546},
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journal = {ISSTA},
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keywords = {automated testing,binary analysis,debugging,dynamic analysis},
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pages = {133},
|
||||
title = {{Undangle: early detection of dangling pointers in use-after-free and double-free vulnerabilities}},
|
||||
url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2338965.2336769},
|
||||
year = {2012}
|
||||
}
|
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@article{Affairs2015,
|
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author = {Affairs, Post Doctoral},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/You can't spell trust without Rust.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
title = {{YOU CAN ' T SPELL TRUST WITHOUT RUST alexis beingessner Master ' s in Computer Science Carleton University}},
|
||||
@article{Xu2015,
|
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abstract = {Since vulnerabilities in Linux kernel are on the increase, attackers have turned their interests into related exploitation techniques. However, compared with numerous researches on exploiting use-after-free vulnerabilities in the user applications, few efforts studied how to exploit use-after-free vulnerabilities in Linux kernel due to the difficulties that mainly come from the uncertainty of the kernel memory layout. Without specific information leakage, attackers could only conduct a blind memory overwriting strategy trying to corrupt the critical part of the kernel, for which the success rate is negligible. In this work, we present a novel memory collision strategy to exploit the use-after-free vulnerabilities in Linux kernel reliably. The insight of our exploit strategy is that a probabilistic memory collision can be constructed according to the widely deployed kernel memory reuse mechanisms, which significantly increases the success rate of the attack. Based on this insight, we present two practical memory collision attacks: An object-based attack that leverages the memory recycling mechanism of the kernel allocator to achieve freed vulnerable object covering, and a physmap-based attack that takes advantage of the overlap between the physmap and the SLAB caches to achieve a more flexible memory manipulation. Our proposed attacks are universal for various Linux kernels of different architectures and could successfully exploit systems with use-after-free vulnerabilities in kernel. Particularly, we achieve privilege escalation on various popular Android devices (kernel version{\textgreater}=4.3) including those with 64-bit processors by exploiting the CVE-2015-3636 use-after-free vulnerability in Linux kernel. To our knowledge, this is the first generic kernel exploit for the latest version of Android. Finally, to defend this kind of memory collision, we propose two corresponding mitigation schemes.},
|
||||
author = {Xu, Wen and Li, Juanru and Shu, Junliang and Yang, Wenbo and Xie, Tianyi and Zhang, Yuanyuan and Gu, Dawu},
|
||||
doi = {10.1145/2810103.2813637},
|
||||
file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/From Collision To Exploitation$\backslash$: Unleashing Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in Linux Kernel.pdf:pdf},
|
||||
isbn = {978-1-4503-3832-5},
|
||||
issn = {15437221},
|
||||
journal = {Ccs},
|
||||
keywords = {linux kernel exploit,memory collision,user-after-free vulnerability},
|
||||
pages = {414--425},
|
||||
title = {{From Collision To Exploitation: Unleashing Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in Linux Kernel}},
|
||||
url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2810103.2813637},
|
||||
year = {2015}
|
||||
}
|
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|
|
|
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Reference in a new issue