bib: new papers
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BibTeX export options can be customized via Options -> BibTeX in Mendeley Desktop
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@article{Balasubramanian2017,
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abstract = {Rust is a new system programming language that offers a practical and safe alternative to C. Rust is unique in that it enforces safety without runtime overhead, most importantly, without the overhead of garbage collection. While zero-cost safety is remarkable on its own, we argue that the super-powers of Rust go beyond safety. In particular, Rust's linear type system enables capabilities that cannot be implemented efficiently in traditional languages, both safe and unsafe, and that dramatically improve security and reliability of system software. We show three examples of such capabilities: zero-copy software fault isolation, efficient static information flow analysis, and automatic checkpointing. While these capabilities have been in the spotlight of systems research for a long time, their practical use is hindered by high cost and complexity. We argue that with the adoption of Rust these mechanisms will become commoditized.},
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author = {Balasubramanian, Abhiram and Baranowski, Marek S and Burtsev, Anton and Irvine, Uc and Rakamari, Zvonimir and Ryzhyk, Leonid and Research, Vmware},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/DRAFT$\backslash$: System Programming in Rust$\backslash$: Beyond Safety.pdf:pdf},
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title = {{DRAFT: System Programming in Rust: Beyond Safety}},
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year = {2017}
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}
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@article{Dhurjati2003,
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abstract = {Traditional approaches to enforcing memory safety of programs rely heavily on runtime checks of memory accesses and on garbage collection, both of which are unattractive for embedded applications. The long-term goal of our work is to enable 100{\%} static enforcement of memory safety for embedded programs through advanced compiler techniques and minimal semantic restrictions on programs. The key result of this paper is a compiler technique that ensures memory safety of dynamically allocated memory without programmer annotations, runtime checks, or garbage collection, and works for a large subclass of type-safe C programs. The technique is based on a fully automatic pool allocation (i.e., region-inference) algorithm for C programs we developed previously, and it ensures safety of dynamically allocated memory while retaining explicit deallocation of individual objects within regions (to avoid garbage collection). For a diverse set of embedded C programs (and using a previous technique to avoid null pointer checks), we show that we are able to statically ensure the safety of pointer and dynamic memory usage in all these programs. We also describe some improvements over our previous work in static checking of array accesses. Overall, we achieve 100{\%} static enforcement of memory safety without new language syntax for a significant subclass of embedded C programs, and the subclass is much broader if array bounds checks are ignored.},
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author = {Dhurjati, D and Kowshik, S and Adve, V and Lattner, C},
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doi = {10.1145/780742.780743},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/Memory Safety Without Runtime Checks or Garbage.pdf:pdf},
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isbn = {0362-1340},
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issn = {03621340},
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journal = {Acm Sigplan Notices},
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keywords = {automatic pool allocation,compilers,embedded systems,languages,programming languages,region management,security,static analysis},
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number = {7},
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pages = {69--80},
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title = {{Memory safety without runtime checks or garbage collection}},
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volume = {38},
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year = {2003}
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@article{Szekeres2013,
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abstract = {Memory corruption bugs in software written in low-level languages like C or C++ are one of the oldest problems in computer security. The lack of safety in these languages allows attackers to alter the program's behavior or take full control over it by hijacking its control flow. This problem has existed for more than 30 years and a vast number of potential solutions have been proposed, yet memory corruption attacks continue to pose a serious threat. Real world exploits show that all currently deployed protections can be defeated. This paper sheds light on the primary reasons for this by describing attacks that succeed on today's systems. We systematize the current knowledge about various protection techniques by setting up a general model for memory corrup- tion attacks. Using this model we show what policies can stop which attacks. The model identifies weaknesses of currently deployed techniques, as well as other proposed protections enforcing stricter policies. We analyze the reasons why protection mechanisms imple- menting stricter polices are not deployed. To achieve wide adoption, protection mechanisms must support a multitude of features and must satisfy a host of requirements. Especially important is performance, as experience shows that only solutions whose overhead is in reasonable bounds get deployed. A comparison of different enforceable policies helps de- signers of new protection mechanisms in finding the balance between effectiveness (security) and efficiency.We identify some open research problems, and provide suggestions on improving the adoption of newer techniques.},
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author = {Szekeres, L??szl?? and Payer, Mathias and Wei, Tao and Song, Dawn},
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doi = {10.1109/SP.2013.13},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/SoK$\backslash$: Eternal War in Memory.pdf:pdf},
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isbn = {9780769549774},
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issn = {10816011},
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journal = {Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy},
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pages = {48--62},
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title = {{SoK: Eternal war in memory}},
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year = {2013}
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}
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@article{Lattner2005,
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abstract = {The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure (http://llvm.cs. uiuc.edu) is a$\backslash$nrobust system that is well suited for a wide variety of research$\backslash$nand development work. This brief paper introduces the LLVM system$\backslash$nand provides pointers to more extensive documentation, complementing$\backslash$nthe tutorial presented at LCPC.},
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@ -43,16 +33,17 @@ title = {{The LLVM Compiler Framework and Infrastructure Tutorial}},
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url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11532378{\_}2},
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year = {2005}
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}
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@article{Merity2016,
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abstract = {Recent neural network sequence models with softmax classifiers have achieved their best language modeling performance only with very large hidden states and large vocabularies. Even then they struggle to predict rare or unseen words even if the context makes the prediction unambiguous. We introduce the pointer sentinel mixture architecture for neural sequence models which has the ability to either reproduce a word from the recent context or produce a word from a standard softmax classifier. Our pointer sentinel-LSTM model achieves state of the art language modeling performance on the Penn Treebank (70.9 perplexity) while using far fewer parameters than a standard softmax LSTM. In order to evaluate how well language models can exploit longer contexts and deal with more realistic vocabularies and larger corpora we also introduce the freely available WikiText corpus.},
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archivePrefix = {arXiv},
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arxivId = {1609.07843},
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author = {Merity, Stephen and Xiong, Caiming and Bradbury, James and Socher, Richard},
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eprint = {1609.07843},
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journal = {Arxiv},
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title = {{Pointer Sentinel Mixture Models}},
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url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1609.07843},
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year = {2016}
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@misc{Endler,
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author = {Endler, Matthias},
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title = {{A curated list of static analysis tools, linters and code quality checkers for various programming languages}},
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url = {https://github.com/mre/awesome-static-analysis}
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}
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@article{Balasubramanian2017,
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abstract = {Rust is a new system programming language that offers a practical and safe alternative to C. Rust is unique in that it enforces safety without runtime overhead, most importantly, without the overhead of garbage collection. While zero-cost safety is remarkable on its own, we argue that the super-powers of Rust go beyond safety. In particular, Rust's linear type system enables capabilities that cannot be implemented efficiently in traditional languages, both safe and unsafe, and that dramatically improve security and reliability of system software. We show three examples of such capabilities: zero-copy software fault isolation, efficient static information flow analysis, and automatic checkpointing. While these capabilities have been in the spotlight of systems research for a long time, their practical use is hindered by high cost and complexity. We argue that with the adoption of Rust these mechanisms will become commoditized.},
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author = {Balasubramanian, Abhiram and Baranowski, Marek S and Burtsev, Anton and Irvine, Uc and Rakamari, Zvonimir and Ryzhyk, Leonid and Research, Vmware},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/DRAFT$\backslash$: System Programming in Rust$\backslash$: Beyond Safety.pdf:pdf},
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title = {{DRAFT: System Programming in Rust: Beyond Safety}},
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year = {2017}
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}
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@inproceedings{Kuznetsov2014,
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abstract = {Systems code is often written in low-level languages like C/C++, which offer many benefits but also dele- gate memory management to programmers. This invites memory safety bugs that attackers can exploit to divert control flow and compromise the system. Deployed de- fense mechanisms (e.g., ASLR, DEP) are incomplete, and stronger defense mechanisms (e.g., CFI) often have high overhead and limited guarantees [19, 15, 9]. We introduce code-pointer integrity (CPI), a new de- sign point that guarantees the integrity of all code point- ers in a program (e.g., function pointers, saved return ad- dresses) and thereby prevents all control-flow hijack at- tacks, including return-oriented programming. We also introduce code-pointer separation (CPS), a relaxation of CPI with better performance properties. CPI and CPS offer substantially better security-to-overhead ratios than the state of the art, they are practical (we protect a complete FreeBSD system and over 100 packages like apache and postgresql), effective (prevent all attacks in the RIPE benchmark), and efficient: on SPEC CPU2006, CPS averages 1.2{\%} overhead for C and 1.9{\%} for C/C++, while CPI's overhead is 2.9{\%} for C and 8.4{\%} for C/C++. A prototype implementation of CPI and CPS can be obtained from http://levee.epfl.ch. 1},
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@ -74,24 +65,6 @@ pages = {1--24},
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title = {{Embedded System Security with Rust}},
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year = {2016}
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}
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@article{Levy2015a,
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abstract = {Rust, a new systems programming language, provides compile-time memory safety checks to help eliminate runtime bugs that manifest from improper memory management. This feature is advantageous for operating system development, and especially for embedded OS development, where recovery and debugging are particularly challenging. However, embedded platforms are highly event-based, and Rust's memory safety mechanisms largely presume threads. In our experience developing an operating system for embedded systems in Rust, we have found that Rust's ownership model prevents otherwise safe resource sharing common in the embedded domain, conflicts with the reality of hardware resources, and hinders using closures for programming asynchronously. We describe these experiences and how they relate to memory safety as well as illustrate our workarounds that preserve the safety guarantees to the largest extent possible. In addition, we draw from our experience to propose a new language extension to Rust that would enable it to provide better memory safety tools for event-driven platforms.},
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author = {Levy, Amit and Andersen, Michael P. and Campbell, Bradford and Culler, David and Dutta, Prabal and Ghena, Branden and Levis, Philip and Pannuto, Pat},
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doi = {10.1145/2818302.2818306},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/tock-plos2015.pdf:pdf},
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isbn = {9781450339421},
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journal = {PLOS: Workshop on Programming Languages and Operating Systems},
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keywords = {embedded operating systems,linear types,ownership,rust},
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pages = {21--26},
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title = {{Ownership is Theft: Experiences Building an Embedded OS in Rust}},
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url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2818302.2818306},
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year = {2015}
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}
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@misc{Endler,
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author = {Endler, Matthias},
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title = {{A curated list of static analysis tools, linters and code quality checkers for various programming languages}},
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url = {https://github.com/mre/awesome-static-analysis}
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}
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@article{Xu2015,
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abstract = {Since vulnerabilities in Linux kernel are on the increase, attackers have turned their interests into related exploitation techniques. However, compared with numerous researches on exploiting use-after-free vulnerabilities in the user applications, few efforts studied how to exploit use-after-free vulnerabilities in Linux kernel due to the difficulties that mainly come from the uncertainty of the kernel memory layout. Without specific information leakage, attackers could only conduct a blind memory overwriting strategy trying to corrupt the critical part of the kernel, for which the success rate is negligible. In this work, we present a novel memory collision strategy to exploit the use-after-free vulnerabilities in Linux kernel reliably. The insight of our exploit strategy is that a probabilistic memory collision can be constructed according to the widely deployed kernel memory reuse mechanisms, which significantly increases the success rate of the attack. Based on this insight, we present two practical memory collision attacks: An object-based attack that leverages the memory recycling mechanism of the kernel allocator to achieve freed vulnerable object covering, and a physmap-based attack that takes advantage of the overlap between the physmap and the SLAB caches to achieve a more flexible memory manipulation. Our proposed attacks are universal for various Linux kernels of different architectures and could successfully exploit systems with use-after-free vulnerabilities in kernel. Particularly, we achieve privilege escalation on various popular Android devices (kernel version{\textgreater}=4.3) including those with 64-bit processors by exploiting the CVE-2015-3636 use-after-free vulnerability in Linux kernel. To our knowledge, this is the first generic kernel exploit for the latest version of Android. Finally, to defend this kind of memory collision, we propose two corresponding mitigation schemes.},
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author = {Xu, Wen and Li, Juanru and Shu, Junliang and Yang, Wenbo and Xie, Tianyi and Zhang, Yuanyuan and Gu, Dawu},
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@ -106,10 +79,68 @@ title = {{From Collision To Exploitation: Unleashing Use-After-Free Vulnerabilit
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url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2810103.2813637},
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year = {2015}
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}
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@article{Affairs2015,
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author = {Affairs, Post Doctoral},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/You can't spell trust without Rust.pdf:pdf},
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title = {{YOU CAN ' T SPELL TRUST WITHOUT RUST alexis beingessner Master ' s in Computer Science Carleton University}},
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@inproceedings{Ma2013,
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abstract = {—Aiming at the problem of higher memory consumption and lower execution efficiency during the dynamic detecting to C/C++ programs memory vulnerabilities, this paper presents a dynamic detection method called ISC. The ISC improves the Safe-C using pointer analysis technology. Firstly, the ISC defines a simple and efficient fat pointer representation instead of the safe pointer in the Safe-C. Furthermore, the ISC uses the unification-based analysis algorithm with one level flow static pointer. This identification reduces the number of pointers that need to be converted to fat pointers. Then in the process of program running, the ISC detects memory vulnerabilities through constantly inspecting the attributes of fat pointers. Experimental results indicate that the ISC could detect memory vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and dangling pointers. Comparing with the Safe-C, the ISC dramatically reduces the memory consumption and lightly improves the execution efficiency.},
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author = {Ma, Rui and Chen, Lingkui and Hu, Changzhen and Xue, Jingfeng and Zhao, Xiaolin},
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booktitle = {Proceedings - 2013 IEEE 11th International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, DASC 2013},
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doi = {10.1109/DASC.2013.37},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/A Dynamic Detection Method to C-C++ Programs Memory Vulnerabilities Based on Pointer Analysis.pdf:pdf},
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isbn = {9781479933815},
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keywords = {dynamic detecting,fat pointer,improved Safe-C,memory vulnerability,pointer analysis},
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pages = {52--57},
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title = {{A dynamic detection method to C/C++ programs memory vulnerabilities based on pointer analysis}},
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year = {2013}
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}
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@article{Chisnall2015,
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abstract = {We propose a new memory-safe interpretation of the C ab-stract machine that provides stronger protection to benefit security and debugging. Despite ambiguities in the specifi-cation intended to provide implementation flexibility, con-temporary implementations of C have converged on a mem-ory model similar to the PDP-11, the original target for C. This model lacks support for memory safety despite well-documented impacts on security and reliability. Attempts to change this model are often hampered by as-sumptions embedded in a large body of existing C code, dat-ing back to the memory model exposed by the original C compiler for the PDP-11. Our experience with attempting to implement a memory-safe variant of C on the CHERI ex-perimental microprocessor led us to identify a number of problematic idioms. We describe these as well as their in-teraction with existing memory safety schemes and the as-sumptions that they make beyond the requirements of the C specification. Finally, we refine the CHERI ISA and abstract model for C, by combining elements of the CHERI capabil-ity model and fat pointers, and present a softcore CPU that implements a C abstract machine that can run legacy C code with strong memory protection guarantees.},
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author = {Chisnall, David and Rothwell, Colin and Watson, Robert N M and Woodruff, Jonathan and Vadera, Munraj and Moore, Simon W and Roe, Michael and Davis, Brooks and Neumann, Peter G},
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doi = {10.1145/2694344.2694367},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/Beyond the PDP-11$\backslash$: Architectural support for a memory-safe C abstract machine.pdf:pdf},
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isbn = {9781450328357},
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issn = {01635964},
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journal = {Proceedings of the Twentieth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems},
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pages = {117--130},
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title = {{Beyond the PDP-11 : Architectural support for a memory-safe C abstract machine}},
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url = {http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/pdfs/201503-asplos2015-cheri-cmachine.pdf},
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year = {2015}
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}
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@article{Merity2016,
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abstract = {Recent neural network sequence models with softmax classifiers have achieved their best language modeling performance only with very large hidden states and large vocabularies. Even then they struggle to predict rare or unseen words even if the context makes the prediction unambiguous. We introduce the pointer sentinel mixture architecture for neural sequence models which has the ability to either reproduce a word from the recent context or produce a word from a standard softmax classifier. Our pointer sentinel-LSTM model achieves state of the art language modeling performance on the Penn Treebank (70.9 perplexity) while using far fewer parameters than a standard softmax LSTM. In order to evaluate how well language models can exploit longer contexts and deal with more realistic vocabularies and larger corpora we also introduce the freely available WikiText corpus.},
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archivePrefix = {arXiv},
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arxivId = {1609.07843},
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author = {Merity, Stephen and Xiong, Caiming and Bradbury, James and Socher, Richard},
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eprint = {1609.07843},
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journal = {Arxiv},
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title = {{Pointer Sentinel Mixture Models}},
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url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1609.07843},
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year = {2016}
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}
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@article{Dhurjati2003,
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abstract = {Traditional approaches to enforcing memory safety of programs rely heavily on runtime checks of memory accesses and on garbage collection, both of which are unattractive for embedded applications. The long-term goal of our work is to enable 100{\%} static enforcement of memory safety for embedded programs through advanced compiler techniques and minimal semantic restrictions on programs. The key result of this paper is a compiler technique that ensures memory safety of dynamically allocated memory without programmer annotations, runtime checks, or garbage collection, and works for a large subclass of type-safe C programs. The technique is based on a fully automatic pool allocation (i.e., region-inference) algorithm for C programs we developed previously, and it ensures safety of dynamically allocated memory while retaining explicit deallocation of individual objects within regions (to avoid garbage collection). For a diverse set of embedded C programs (and using a previous technique to avoid null pointer checks), we show that we are able to statically ensure the safety of pointer and dynamic memory usage in all these programs. We also describe some improvements over our previous work in static checking of array accesses. Overall, we achieve 100{\%} static enforcement of memory safety without new language syntax for a significant subclass of embedded C programs, and the subclass is much broader if array bounds checks are ignored.},
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author = {Dhurjati, D and Kowshik, S and Adve, V and Lattner, C},
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doi = {10.1145/780742.780743},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/Memory Safety Without Runtime Checks or Garbage.pdf:pdf},
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isbn = {0362-1340},
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issn = {03621340},
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journal = {Acm Sigplan Notices},
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keywords = {automatic pool allocation,compilers,embedded systems,languages,programming languages,region management,security,static analysis},
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number = {7},
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pages = {69--80},
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title = {{Memory safety without runtime checks or garbage collection}},
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volume = {38},
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year = {2003}
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}
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@article{Levy2015a,
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abstract = {Rust, a new systems programming language, provides compile-time memory safety checks to help eliminate runtime bugs that manifest from improper memory management. This feature is advantageous for operating system development, and especially for embedded OS development, where recovery and debugging are particularly challenging. However, embedded platforms are highly event-based, and Rust's memory safety mechanisms largely presume threads. In our experience developing an operating system for embedded systems in Rust, we have found that Rust's ownership model prevents otherwise safe resource sharing common in the embedded domain, conflicts with the reality of hardware resources, and hinders using closures for programming asynchronously. We describe these experiences and how they relate to memory safety as well as illustrate our workarounds that preserve the safety guarantees to the largest extent possible. In addition, we draw from our experience to propose a new language extension to Rust that would enable it to provide better memory safety tools for event-driven platforms.},
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author = {Levy, Amit and Andersen, Michael P. and Campbell, Bradford and Culler, David and Dutta, Prabal and Ghena, Branden and Levis, Philip and Pannuto, Pat},
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doi = {10.1145/2818302.2818306},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/github/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/tock-plos2015.pdf:pdf},
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isbn = {9781450339421},
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journal = {PLOS: Workshop on Programming Languages and Operating Systems},
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keywords = {embedded operating systems,linear types,ownership,rust},
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pages = {21--26},
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title = {{Ownership is Theft: Experiences Building an Embedded OS in Rust}},
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url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2818302.2818306},
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year = {2015}
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}
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@article{Caballero2012,
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@ -125,14 +156,9 @@ title = {{Undangle: early detection of dangling pointers in use-after-free and d
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url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2338965.2336769},
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year = {2012}
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}
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@inproceedings{Ma2013,
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abstract = {—Aiming at the problem of higher memory consumption and lower execution efficiency during the dynamic detecting to C/C++ programs memory vulnerabilities, this paper presents a dynamic detection method called ISC. The ISC improves the Safe-C using pointer analysis technology. Firstly, the ISC defines a simple and efficient fat pointer representation instead of the safe pointer in the Safe-C. Furthermore, the ISC uses the unification-based analysis algorithm with one level flow static pointer. This identification reduces the number of pointers that need to be converted to fat pointers. Then in the process of program running, the ISC detects memory vulnerabilities through constantly inspecting the attributes of fat pointers. Experimental results indicate that the ISC could detect memory vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and dangling pointers. Comparing with the Safe-C, the ISC dramatically reduces the memory consumption and lightly improves the execution efficiency.},
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author = {Ma, Rui and Chen, Lingkui and Hu, Changzhen and Xue, Jingfeng and Zhao, Xiaolin},
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booktitle = {Proceedings - 2013 IEEE 11th International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, DASC 2013},
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doi = {10.1109/DASC.2013.37},
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isbn = {9781479933815},
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keywords = {dynamic detecting,fat pointer,improved Safe-C,memory vulnerability,pointer analysis},
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pages = {52--57},
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title = {{A dynamic detection method to C/C++ programs memory vulnerabilities based on pointer analysis}},
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year = {2013}
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@article{Affairs2015,
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author = {Affairs, Post Doctoral},
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file = {:home/steveej/src/steveej/msc-thesis/docs/You can't spell trust without Rust.pdf:pdf},
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title = {{YOU CAN ' T SPELL TRUST WITHOUT RUST alexis beingessner Master ' s in Computer Science Carleton University}},
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year = {2015}
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}
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